Hitler was lucky because while the party gave so much to him, he didn't have to do much for the party. Other leaders in the party did most of the practical political work while Hitler sat back and didn't even bother to intervene until it was absolutely necessary. Hitler's main job was to give speeches and to retain his mysterious image as the savior of Germany in the public's eyes.
Even though he didn't do much practical work, all the glory went to Hitler and Hitler only. Even when public was bitter towards the party, he could do no wrong. Hitler myth "carried deep symbolic significance" that Hitler himself is Germany (68). One voter even wrote "For Hitler, Yes, for his Big-Shots, No" on the ballot (68).
This made me think about what happened in Korea few years ago. Former president Roh-Moo-Hyun was criticized for his poor decisions and by the end of his term, and he brought the popularity of his party down. Therefore, in the next election, a candidate from another party won. However, when he committed suicide for complicated reasons, Koreans grew sympathy and respect towards him. Because his image improved dramatically after his death, the party that he was in also gained more popularity. Even though the party itself didn't do much, a representative figure of the party changed its popularity among the public. I thought this was interesting because in this case, public's perception of the party and the party leader was coherent.
It's interesting how the media can play such a large part of engendering a certain public sentiment. As in the case of the former Korean president, Hitler receieved sympathy, being portrayed as the victim of political shortcomings. The public saw the incidents in the favor of Hitler, who had been "continually let down by his compatriots" (167). Well into the 1940s, and Hitler, real and inspiring, had still been thought a separate entity from the cold Party; "'The Fuhrer, yes! The Party, no!"' (167).
ReplyDeleteSlowly and surely, the stance that Hitler took in being 'peace-loving' contrasted deeply with the "'total war'" that was burdening Germany. Not too long ago, Hitler promised an end to the 'phoney war' but instead instigated a full-fledged war. Victories would not be enough, because the war would prove to be too taxing for the country. Besides, who could forget that Germany once enjoyed full employment? Could the public see how their country had fell under the pressure of war and the resulting labor shortages? Dissent started at the bottom, the farthest from Hitler's circle, being that their hardships were the harshest. Not to mention, it was through these labor shortages that the Propaganda Ministry was shut down in order to compensate for the economic losses (199).
I think Kershaw makes a convincing argument that stresses Hitler's popularity with the public in conjunction with the fortuitous economic advances, diplomatic successes, and military victories. However, this winning streak could only last so long. Under the burdens of war, fear, and labor shortages, Hitler was not protected, especially without the spin of the propaganda machine. Hitler could fall with the rest of the Party as they had nothing good to bring to the country, and no one to tell them otherwise. Hitler, by association with the Party, and without Goebbels to distort and play up Hitler's infallibility and distance, was doomed to fall under the disgruntled public who saw the difference between being peace-loving and Hitler's broken promise of being 'peace-loving.'